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Abstract— This paper is structured as an informal dialogue 
between two members of the EINS (www.internet-science.eu) 
Network of Excellence: a sociologist (Laura Sartori) and an 
engineer (Paolo Dini). The deck is stacked since the engineer also 
taught physics for a number of years, has been studying social 
and economic theory for the past 10 years, and is also currently 
active in mathematical and theoretical computer science 
research. The purpose of the paper is to provide an overview of 
the epistemological bases of different disciplinary perspectives as 
a first step towards developing a methodology of analysis of the 
Internet as a scientific object of study. To complement well-
established areas of Internet Science such as networking and 
information theory, the paper regards three areas of social 
science as particularly important: social constructivism, power 
and knowledge, and domains of value. Of these, we focus on the 
first and only touch on the other two. The paper builds on 
previous research which concluded that it is impossible to 
develop a unified interdisciplinary theoretical framework due to 
irreconcilable epistemological differences, but that it is possible 
and very worthwhile for those adhering to various disciplinary 
perspectives to collaborate towards the achievement of a 
practical joint endeavour. In our view the Internet exemplifies 
the ultimate example of such an endeavour. 
Keywords: epistemology; interdisciplinarity; social construct-
ivism; internet science; methodology 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Laura Sartori: Good morning, what are we talking about 
today? 
Paolo Dini: I would like to discuss the epistemological 
structure of the EINS project because I find it extremely 
interesting and potentially transformative for how we do 
science. 
LS: In Italy ‘epistemology’ carries a connotation of 
‘history of science’. However, I think you are probably 
referring to the more Foucauldian meaning of ‘construction of 
knowledge’? 
PD: Yes, correct. The Greek root of ‘science’ means 
‘knowledge’, so we could easily tie ourselves in knots, here, 
but in today’s English this distinction makes sense. In other 
words, we can take epistemology to mean construction of 
knowledge, but with an awareness of a deeper set of issues, as 
encapsulated in this brief quotation: 
The episteme is the ‘apparatus’ which makes possible the 
separation, not of the true from the false, but of what may 
from what may not be characterised as scientific. (Foucault 
1980: 197) 
LS: Very nice, but why are you introducing the ‘apparatus’ 
so soon? 
PD: Well, the cognitive landscape we need to explore is 
multi-dimensional and very complex, so our dialogical 
narrative can hardly be expected to be linear. I am afraid we 
will have to jump around a bit and may need to distribute the 
explaination of concepts at different places in the paper.  
LS: Right, so we are writing a paper, and this paper 
appears to have a distinctive philosophy of science flavour. 
PD: Yes, it seems like a good way of making sense of the 
EINS project, or of the Internet, for that matter. 
LS: Where do we start? 
PD: From my point of view, this paper builds on a paper I 
co-wrote with Mehita Iqani and Robin Mansell (Dini et al. 
2011) at the end of the radically interdisciplinary EU-funded 
Network of Excellence OPAALS,1 which had some 
similarities with EINS. OPAALS was concerned with digital 
ecosystems as a socially constructed ecosystem metaphor of 
socio-technical and economic environments of particular 
relevance to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and 
aiming to maximize sustainable development and/or 
collaborative knowledge construction.2 OPAALS took the 
existence of the Internet for granted. In addition to aiming to 
develop a ‘science of digital ecosystems’ and a community of 
practice in this science, it also had the applied aims of 
sustainable socio-economic development led by SMEs and 
catalysed by information and communication technologies 
(ICTs). EINS, by contrast, seems more fundamental to me: it 
is focused entirely on scientific objectives, i.e. understanding 
the Internet as a socio-technical-economic phenomenon, on 
developing a ‘science of the Internet’, and of course also on 
the development of an Internet Science community. 
LS: Very interesting. So, in EINS we are interested in 
identifying the concepts and thought processes that enable 
                                                            
1 Open Philosophies for Associative Autopoietic Digital Ecosystems (2006-
10), http://www.opaals.eu  	  
2 At the same time, digital ecosystems as understood in the OPAALS project 
and in its precursor DBE (Digital Business Ecosystem, 2003-07, 
http://files.opaals.eu/DBE) were meant to benefit from a certain level of self-
organized and autonomic behaviour in the software itself, i.e. as far as the 
software is concerned the research attempted to develop an ecosystem model, 
in addition to treating the concept of ecosystem as metaphor. This latter, 
mathematical, work was pursued also in the BIONETS project (Biologically-
Inspired Networks and Services, 2006-10, http://www.bionets.eu) and is still 
on-going in the currently active BIOMICS project (Biological and 
Mathematical Basis of Interaction Computing, 2012-15, 
http://www.biomicsproject.eu). 
making sense of the Internet from a social, economic, and 
technical perspective. Am I right? 
PD: Yes, but first we need to define the framework within 
which we will be working. 
LS: In terms of the ontological dimensions and 
epistemological perspectives for Internet Science? 
PD: Precisely. Figure 1 shows the analytical framework I 
propose we follow. At the top of the figure you can see what I 
would call the analytical categories that we are going to utilize 
to orient ourselves in the discussion. The second group of 
concepts are three themes or dimensions that I consider 
necessary to Internet Science, although clearly not sufficient. 
Since the ground covered by these themes is rather vast, we 
should focus on social constructivism as a running thread for 
this paper, touching on the other two dimensions only briefly. 
We could leave more in-depth discussions of power/ 
knowledge and value domains to future dialogues. The bottom 
group of terms lists some of the main pairs of opposite 
perspectives in how we construct our understanding of society. 
In this and the following papers I would like to show how 
1- each of these viewpoints relies on its own ontological 
priorities and epistemological machinery; 
2- the Internet appears to be bridging several if not all of 
them, often in surprising ways; and 
3- attempts to reconcile these binary opposites often lead 
to the development of interesting theories 
LS: OK, this sounds pretty ambitious, but I guess it’s 
worth a try. 
 
Fig. 1. Analytical framework underpinning the dialogue 
 
II. THE METHODOLOGY OF INTERNET SCIENCE 
PD: Right, as we were saying, in EINS we are interested in 
identifying the concepts and thought processes that enable 
making sense of the Internet also from a political viewpoint, 
which relates to governance issues. 
LS: Of course. But in describing OPAALS you seemed to 
be mixing social construction with mathematics. Why, and 
how, do you do that? 
PD: That’s a scary question. No, in those projects, and also 
in EINS, I think we can afford to overlook the socially 
constructed aspects of mathematics and simplify our 
discussion considerably by treating the hard sciences and 
mathematics as objectivist. The social sciences… 
LS: We will talk about the social aspects of mathematics 
and informatics (as in coding and programming) another time, 
but, please, just let me cite this quote by Albert Einstein: 
As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not 
certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to 
reality.  (quoted in Newman 2003[1956]) 
PD: Ah, nice one! The social sciences can be both 
objectivist and subjectivist, of course, but in this paper, again 
for the sake of simplicity, I would like to emphasize the 
subjectivist perspective in social science and de-emphasize 
quantitative methods.3,4 Anyway, before we get to that, let me 
clarify what I mean by ‘socially constructed’ through the 
words of Boghossian: 
To say of something that it is socially constructed is to 
emphasize its dependence on contingent aspects of our social 
selves. It is to say: This thing could not have existed had we 
not built it; and we need not have built it at all, at least not in 
its present form. Had we been a different kind of society, had 
we had different needs, values, or interests, we might well 
have built a different kind of thing, or built this one 
differently. The inevitable contrast is with a naturally existing 
object, something that exists independently of us and which 
we did not have a hand in shaping. There are certainly many 
things, and facts about them, that are socially constructed in 
the sense specified by this core idea: money, citizenship and 
newspapers, for example. None of these things could have 
existed without society; and each of them could have been 
constructed differently had we so chosen. (Boghossian, 2001) 
LS: I agree entirely. But you seem to like to add more of a 
philosophical twist to our conversation than some sociologists 
would! Social construction is one of the most interesting 
processes to be studied, also because it operates across all 
disciplines. Not only the social sciences. There are many 
aspects of the Internet that could be described as socially 
constructed. In other words, the Internet has become “real” in 
people’s minds and in people’s lives, in spite of their 
ignorance of the “objective” aspects of the Internet. They 
don’t understand its technical structure, but they “use” it, they 
talk about it, they incorporate it in their daily routines. Yet, the 
Internet as a technology does not drive what people do, as a 
technologically deterministic view might suggests. 
Technology allows for certain activities, and users and actors 
domesticate and shape it to fit their own goals. Something 
analogous has happened in the past as well. Take the 
refrigerator, for example. In the 1950s refrigerators were used 
to preserve drugs and women tights, not just food. Also the 
telephone or electricity – whose technical details were largely 
unknown at the time – were used very differently from today 
(Fischer 2000; Marvin 1988). The social construction of 
technology depends on the socio-technical frame (Flichy 
1995), reflecting user practices and collective representations 
in a given historical period. 
PD: Very true. This point connects to another disciplinary 
perspective on the phenomenon, namely anthropology, which 
views technology as a cultural artefact and/or as an extension 
of language. As you just said, the Internet has made it much 
                                                            
3 Social network analysis is an example of an area of social science that has 
been usefully complemented by mathematical concepts; however, it still 
leaves most of the questions social scientists are interested in unanswered.	  
4 Qualitative methods include questionnaires, participant observation 
(ethnography), individual interviews, focus groups, etc.	  
Ontology: What reality is made of
Epistemology: How knowledge is constructed
Methodology: How we do science
Main Dimensions of Discussion
• Social Constructivism (this paper)
• Power and Knowledge
• Domains of Value
Ontological, Epistemological and Methodological Binaries
• Subjectivist/Hermeneutic -- Objectivist/Positivist
• Empiricist/Inductive -- Rationalist/Deductive
• Individualist/Constructivist -- Collectivist/Structuralist
• Existentialist/Context-Dependent -- Essentialist/Context-Free
• Conflict-Based -- Regulation-Based
more obvious to most laypersons (and, of course, some 
computer scientists!) that technology embodies our cultural 
values (Feenberg 1999, 2001), for example through the Net 
Neutrality debate. Deep packet inspection can enable the 
prioritization of certain content streams over others; whereas 
this is often proposed as a market-driven evolution of the web, 
it also has implications for freedom of expression. Backing 
one or the other side (i.e. supporting or not Net Neutrality) has 
social, political and economic consequences. Another example 
is provided by centralized architectures, which make top-down 
control more feasible, versus distributed P2P architectures, 
which facilitate individual freedom on the web. Although 
whether or not control or freedom can be justified in some 
cases very much depends on the point of view, the point is that 
architectural or technological features embody our social, 
economic, political and moral values.  
LS: Might we say that our actions, decisions, and 
behaviours are value-oriented and they result in shaping public 
opinion (or the dominant perception/opinion, as Habermas 
would say)? 
PD: Sure, but the less obvious point here is that the same 
values influence what technologies we build and how they 
work. 
LS: Just perfect! A sociologist and an engineer that agree 
on the social construction of technology seems to be a nice 
start for our Internet Science. For this purpose, we consider 
the sociological, anthropological, economic, technical, and 
political dimensions, even though each of these perspectives 
relies on sometimes slightly different and sometimes radically 
different ways of analysing and making sense of the object of 
study, in other words of constructing knowledge. This is what 
we mean by different epistemologies? 
PD: Yes. The incredible thing about the Internet is that it is 
forcing together areas of science that had previously 
maintained a “safe” distance from each other. In many cases, 
however, this still is not sufficient for mutual understanding to 
emerge, precisely because the ontological and epistemological 
building blocks are so different, incompatible, and often 
incommensurate. 
LS: This gives a nudge to our conversation. What is 
science? What is Internet Science? To begin to answer these 
questions I need to go back to the philosophy (and history) of 
science, trying to grab some useful concepts for our inter-
epistemological effort. By the way, as you will see, I will try 
to turn epistemological problems into methodological issues.  
PD: Is this actually possible? 
LS: I believe science is a social construction, as I 
expressed earlier. Sociology can, thus, try to solve empirical 
questions that traditionally pertained to the philosophical 
realm. In my opinion this is the path we have to follow to 
make different areas of science talk to each other. I will briefly 
sketch my personal preference in terms of construction of 
knowledge. Had I lived in the 19th Century (or before), I 
would have been an empiricist rather than a rationalist. I 
would have studied social phenomena through inductive 
methods, not deductive. I am more a fan of Max Weber than 
Emile Durkheim since Weber considers social action to be 
oriented by actors’ motivations and preferences. By constrast, 
Durkheim, the value of whose work on statistical and 
quantitative methods is undeniable, regards actors as 
powerless and believes general laws to be operating in society 
exactly as they do in physics. Two threads of research have 
emerged since the time of this basic dichotomy: 
Interpretativism and Positivism. Very roughly, we can state 
that the first (also called Hermeneutics) focused on 
interpreting social phenomena through the understanding 
(verstehen) of individual points of view, while the second5 
tried to explain social phenomena through statistical data. We 
might call these two positions ‘paradigms’, as Thomas Kuhn 
would say (1996). 
PD: Didn’t Kuhn theorize scientific revolutions?  
LS: Yes, Kuhn for the first time asserted that knowledge is 
not cumulative. At a certain point, the paradigm just changes 
and all assumptions, hypotheses and results with it. When 
Copernico (or Galileo) was credited for his theories about the 
solar system, the previous Earth-centred solar system was 
simply rejected. The same happened with Netwon or 
Einstein’s ideas. All of a sudden paradigms change. 
PD: The way I like to put it is that a Kuhnian paradigm is a 
body of theory combined with a community of practice and a 
set of methodologies. This is to be contrasted with the use of 
the term in computer science and in common parlance, which 
tends to be more limited to a ‘model’. 
LS: Sure. The very point here is that Kuhn says that 
different paradigms are incommensurate, because profoundly 
different in terms of – as Foucault would say – apparatus, as 
you mentioned earlier. Yet, they can communicate. In other 
words, they cannot be “measured” by the same unit of 
measurement, but they can still have a dialogue. And I think 
this is exactly what you meant in your paper (Dini et al. 2010). 
PD: Foucault’s apparatus is also closely concerned with 
the interplay between power and knowledge, but I see what 
you mean. In any case, when I call for an integration, not a 
unification, of different sciences, I mean the following. If 
‘unification’ is understood to imply considering two or more 
apparently unrelated phenomena within the same theory or 
model, then ‘integration’ is understood to enable different 
theories to coexist with a degree of compatibility that does not 
imply that the same theoretical foundation underpins them. An 
example of the former is electricity and magnetism which 
were thought to be different physical phenomena until a single 
set of equations was derived by Maxwell (1873). An example 
of the latter is the understanding of computers as media of 
communications, rooted ultimately in Heidegger’s pheno-
menology, sitting side-by-side the understanding of computers 
as machines operating on objective data and whose functions 
can be optimized (Winograd and Flores 1987). 
LS: Exactly, we are not looking forward to a new unified 
single science, but to an integration of different visions of 
science. Even in the natural (or hard) sciences there are 
competing views (as well as methods, hypotheses, and values). 
And, especially in social science, different paradigms and 
visions co-exist easily, such as qualitative and quantitative 
methods, post-positivistism and interpretativism, etc. The 
competition between quantum mechanics and general 
relativity is a perfect example for the hard sciences. They 
explain two different aspects of behaviour, one at micro-level 
and the other at macro-level. 
                                                            
5 Today we talk more properly of neo-positivism because the search for 
general laws governing society has shown its weaknesses, leaving an opening 
to a probabilistic approach through statistics. It is recognized that there are 
hypotheses to be tested to attain a certain degree of generalization and 
standardization.	  
PD: Yes, right, they are incommensurate, although in this 
specific case there is at least a chance, in principle, of 
mathematical unification (e.g. string theory). But in general I 
agree that different paradigms from all the disciplines of the 
consortium can start dialoguing since there is no competition! 
LS: Definitely. One starting assumption we should make 
and stick to is that coexistence is possible if there are no 
“imperialistic” tendencies by any one discipline over the 
others in terms of “superior” techniques or value-production 
of their own discipline over another. 
PD: As Foucault would put it, we should avoid ‘the 
tyranny of globalizing discourses’ (1980: 83). 
LS: Yes. As I was saying above, I think methodology is the 
key for setting up an Internet Science. Given our differences in 
ontologies, epistemologies and research techniques, I believe 
that methodology is the key to our conversation. Methodology 
could work as a bridge across the different epistemologies at 
play precisely because Internet Science is a practice that 
straddles all the disciplines we have been discussing. 
PD: So, what do you mean by methodology? 
LS: Methodology refers to the techniques we choose when 
facing a cognitive problem, which could be either theoretical 
or applied. Obviously we will differ because we have different 
cognitive issues and research problems, not to mention skill-
sets. The good news is that we can solve that. As Feyerabend 
stated, there is no one scientific method better or superior to 
others (1975). 
PD: I agree, although it sounds a bit abstract. As we 
concluded in the article I mentioned above (Dini et al. 2011), 
it is possible and very worthwhile for those adhering to 
various disciplinary perspectives to collaborate towards the 
achievement of a practical joint endeavour. I think the Internet 
exemplifies the ultimate example of such an endeavour. 
LS: What we can borrow from Feyerabend is the fact that 
change (in paradigm) at the theoretical level is driven by 
interests, ideology, and cultural beliefs (convictions), not by a 
specific method – i.e. by a “more scientific” method. 
PD: So… your proposal for the foundations of an Internet 
Science is…? 
LS: Well,  I would propose to think in terms of a ‘research 
programme’ (Lakatos, 1976). A research programme is not a 
closed system of a few, measurable and static theories. It is a 
living, open system where scientists discuss, compare and 
contrast different ideas or solve problems as they emerge, 
prioritize or abandon hypotheses, etc. Thus, they contribute to 
the progress of science. Take Newton’s theory of gravitation, 
Einstein’s relativity, Freud’s psychoanalysis, or Marx’s theory 
of capital. They all have a core (2-3 definitions) exemplified 
through auxiliary propositions connected to historical facts. In 
Marx the theory of surplus value occupies the core, while 
alienation, revolution and failing profit rate are auxiliary 
theories. Decades later the Marxist tradition maintained the 
core but adapted to different contexts and auxiliary 
propositions. 
PD: So, it sounds like you think that Internet science needs 
a ‘research programme’, where each discipline maintains its 
core while adapting to and interacting through auxiliary 
hypotheses? 
LS: Yes. Methodology is the tool, the “practical language” 
as you would say, to build knowledge. Computer and social 
science can contribute and interact productively because they 
both share a scientific method that can solve both applied and 
philosophical cognitive problems. When you speak of 
‘practical joint endeavour’, I hear ‘methodology can translate 
philosophical problems into practical cognitive problems’. In 
this sense it can handle both theory and practice. Moreover, 
our goal is ambitious: we (social scientists) study causal 
connections between social conditions and knowledge in the 
information society, in our contemporary society (supporting 
hypotheses and theories with empirical evidence). 
PD: Are you saying that we have to think really “big” in 
order to understand the causal connections underlying our 
society? I agree, we have to fly beyond single-discipline 
boundaries, answering the call for integration that ICTs have 
implicitly launched. 
LS: I really believe that what we need today is new 
thinkers able to grasp the complexity we are experiencing, as 
Max Weber did at the dawn of capitalism6 when he set up the 
methodological basis for modern sociology. Again, the 
Internet is calling us to set up a methodology (a ‘research 
programme’) for the science of the 21st Century. Each 
discipline uses different methods because it tries to answer 
different research questions stemming from alternative 
cognitive and epistemological problems. Each discipline sheds 
light on a limited portion of knowledge. Since as we said ICTs 
serve as a “practical” bridge across disciplines (and across 
paradigms), we need not only the social sciences to agree and 
cooperate but also the hard sciences to listen to research 
questions that have been posed in a different way.  
PD: OK, science itself has to be thought of as ‘open’ to 
critical thinking, as Popper suggested. Critiques grow out of 
differences in scientists’ certainties and beliefs: as Popper 
says, this is the only path to knowledge! I see your point: 
Internet Science has to cross disciplinary fences, exercise 
critical thinking by encouraging each discipline to borrow 
from the others and… just build knowledge. 
LS: Precisely. Otherwise, we remain stuck in the familiar 
scenario where computer scientists develop the best-technical-
platform-ever for – let’s say – participation (by individuals, 
associations, governments). Yet, if they do not take into 
considerations, for example, social actors, material and 
symbolic resources, social and economic values attributed to 
that specific social action, privacy concerns… in short, if they 
do not account for social and institutional actors (their 
preferences, their values, their social relations), the best 
platform remains a “perfect”, yet closed, system. 
PD: Yes, I know… we tend to design closed systems 
because it is easier to define ceteris paribus conditions and, 
from this, test hypotheses and infer some conclusions. It is like 
economics: it relies heavily on mathematics and modelling, 
but it often fails because its models do not fully reflect the real 
world. 
LS: Of course, I agree with that. I want to sum up and end 
this part of the discussion with two points. The first relates to 
methodology, paradigms, and dialogue while the second to the 
nature of science: 
                                                            
6 Weber investigated the conditions upon which the capitalist system grew in 
his masterpiece The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Weber, 
2012[1905]). More importantly, he also set up the methodological basis for 
modern sociology.	  
1. Methodology, thus, is the key to solve epistemological 
differences that can be still challenged within a single 
discipline but do not adversely affect Internet Science. 
2. By now, it should be clear that science – generally 
speaking – is a social construction. 
PD: True, I acknowledge that even in the hard sciences 
interests and ideologies can have influences that are more than 
conceivable or acceptable. Think about the research on stem 
cells, the battle over IPV6, regulatory standards for Intellectual 
Property protection, the Net Neutrality debate I mentioned 
before, SOPA, ACTA,7 etc. It is clear: dominant opinions 
shape science, because it is socially constructed in a mutual 
process where multiple actors play. 
LS: Our mission should be, then 
1. To establish the (methodological) basis for a dialogue 
that teases and provokes points of contact.8 By so doing 
we will have a higher chance to discover what bases 
are needed by an Internet science. 
2. To understand that our research results can orient and 
influence the form the Internet (and, consequently, 
Internet Science) will take. 
PD: So, even though straight translation between social 
science and hard science concepts is often not possible, as 
long as one keeps in mind the ontological assumptions and the 
epistemological processes involved an interesting dialogue 
obtains? 
LS: Yes. Each discipline has its own paradigm, which is 
incommensurate with other paradigms. Yet, they can try to 
talk to each other without worrying about losing their primacy 
because they respect each other’s epistemological bases. The 
history of science is full of examples to the contrary, for 
instance Keynes’s and Hayek’s ideas in economics, Weber’s 
and Durkheim’s, or Parsons and The Frankfurt School in 
sociology, etc. But in Internet Science we should make an 
effort to avoid such polarizations. 
PD: Not that one should expect communication to be easy, 
but at least there is a better chance of getting across to each 
other – and to learn from each other. 
LS: Yes, if there is no “imperialist” vision (e.g. computer 
science over social science) I believe that the Internet – as a 
technical and a social product – can facilitate dialogue and 
collaborative knowledge construction. Would you bet that in 
the long run computer scientists will design really usable 
technologies, for example (how often they realize that outside 
of the laboratory the ‘average user’ is not able to use what they 
invented)? And that social scientists will elaborate hypotheses 
and narratives that are down-to-earth (that is, that consider 
technical aspects, actors, and contexts all at the same time)? 
                                                            
7 SOPA = Stop Online Piracy Act; ACTA = Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement.	  
8 For example, for economists consumer decisions are the product of 
independent evaluations deriving from high-level information and budget 
constraints (for example, ‘I have E30k, I like red cars, so I can afford a red 
BMW since the latest model costs E29.9k’), whereas for sociologists 
consumption has a strong relational character (it depends on others’ 
preferences) and on the symbolic value of goods, which can be more 
important than its use value (for example, ‘I want to buy a new car for my 
second house in the countryside, I like red or blue cars and I like Toyotas, but 
many friends told me that they don’t have reliable 4-wheel drive; my best 
friend suggested a Range Rover to me, it costs just E2000 more than my 
budget, I think I’ll go for it’). So this would mean making economists look at 
preferences more closely and making (some) sociologists utilize a higher 
degree of formalization.	  
PD: Yes! Nicely put. 
III. A SYSTEM OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL BINARIES FOR 
INTERNET SCIENCE 
PD: Now that we have a better understanding of how to 
work together, i.e. through a joint applied endeavour and/or by 
focusing on methodology, we can continue discussing the 
ontological and methodological, but mainly epistemological, 
binaries of Figure 1. Paraphrasing Anthony Giddens, the 
difficult aspect of social science is that, unlike what happens 
in physics, the object of research has opinions about what is 
being said about them. How many opinions? As many as there 
are individuals. Clearly it may become too difficult to account 
for or work with that many, so that is why we engage in 
dialogue and various kinds of interactions (political, social, 
economic) to work towards some level of consensus, thereby 
reducing the number of opinions out there. 
LS: I would put it differently. I would say that the social 
sciences deal with multi-faceted social, economic and political 
phenomena where actors and institutions play complex and 
intertwined roles. Since economics and sociology were born, 
pundits debated about these disciplines’ ability to grasp social 
reality. Far from 19th Century positivist positions,9 I believe 
that it is possible to study social, economic and political 
phenomena by means of Max Weber’s Ideal Types. Ideal 
types are analytical tools for representing the main traits of 
historically-grounded phenomena. For example, what we 
generally know as power, (or capitalism or state) has various 
declinations: charismatic, traditional-bureaucratic or legal-
rational. Think of different types of power you encounter in 
daily life. You recognize somebody as powerful because he is 
gifted (Julius Ceasar, Napoleon, Hitler had charisma), or you 
acknowledge beliefs and behaviours as powerful because they 
are strictly linked to traditions (i.e. religion), or because they 
originated from a legal framework (i.e. a constitution and 
democratic structures). It is clear that these ideal types can be 
encountered in different contexts at different historical 
moments. Yet, they will help reconcile particular traits within 
a more general analytical framework. 
PD: Trigilia explains ideal types as follows: 
The formulation of generalizations – which Weber called 
‘ideal types’ – has specifc spatial and temporal limitations 
and essentially aims to improve historical knowledge. 
(Trigilia 1998: 6) 
So perhaps what you mean is that power is an ideal type, but it 
takes the different forms you list above in the different 
contexts? 
LS: Sure, that’s fair. 
PD: Since you mention power, let me cite Foucault again: 
It is not possible for power to be exercised without 
knowledge, it is impossible for knowledge not to engender 
power. ‘Liberate scientific research from the demands of 
monopoly capitalism’: maybe it’s a good slogan, but it will 
never be more than a slogan. (Foucault 1980: 52) 
Foucault also addressed the “imperialism” of science that you 
mentioned earlier, which seems particularly relevant to 
Internet Science: 
                                                            
9 The central assumption of positivism in the 19th Century was that the social 
and natural sciences share a common nomological framework in explaining 
how single phenomena stem from general laws and in making use of 
organicist analogies.	  
What types of knowledge do you want to disqualify in the 
very instant of your demand: ‘It is a science’? … Which 
theoretical-political avant garde do you want to enthrone in 
order to isolate it from all the discontinuous forms of 
knowledge that circulate about it? … in contrast to the 
various projects which aim to inscribe knowledges in the 
hierarchical order of power associated with science, a 
genealogy should be seen as a kind of attempt to emancipate 
historical knowledges from that subjection, to render them, 
that is, capable of opposition and of struggle against the 
coercion of a theoretical, unitary, formal and scientific 
discourse. (1980: 85) 
What I find interesting about Foucault is that to him power is 
not just ‘oppressive’, ‘coercive’, or ‘hegemonic’. Power can 
also be “horizontal”, it can be ‘productive’ not just destructive. 
This means that power can sustain and transmit complex 
relationships among the component parts of society. He 
captures these ideas through the concept of the apparatus, 
which I mentioned at the beginning and which seems 
particularly fitting for how we can think about the Internet: 
…a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of 
discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory 
decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific 
statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic 
propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such 
are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the 
system of relations that can be established between these 
elements. … The apparatus is thus always inscribed in a play 
of power, but it is also always linked to certain coordinates of 
knowledge which issue from it but, to an equal degree, 
condition it. This is what the apparatus consists in: strategies 
of relations of forces supporting, and supported by, types of 
knowledge. (1980: 195, 196) 
LS: I see, this is interesting. And I agree, it can be useful 
for us. Anyway, I can see political and social interactions 
potentially leading to consensus, but how do economic 
interactions lead to consensus? 
PD: This point is tricky to argue. I believe that the degree 
to which economic interactions can afford to approach the 
“free market” is proportional to the democratic maturity of the 
society within which those economic interactions are 
embedded.10 
LS: That’s an outrageous statement. 
PD: Sorry. Probably impossible to prove. But as an Italian 
that has lived in different democracies (IT, US, IE, UK) it 
feels right. Of course there is no such thing as a free market. 
The fact that we may feel more or less free to buy and sell 
whatever we want does not mean that the market itself is 
“free”.  
LS: That’s for sure!!! 
PD: In order to function properly, in addition to contracts 
markets need accountability rules, laws, institutions of various 
kinds and sizes, physical infrastructure, standards, and so 
forth. So mine is a superficial perception which, however, I 
believe is echoed by the current Euro/sovereign debt crisis. I 
wrote a paper on community currencies that discusses this 
point in more depth (Dini 2012). We can look at the Swiss 
WIR parallel currency, for example, which has been going 
strong since 1936. It balances solidarity with trade, 
entrepreneurship with accountability and banking law, and 
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explicitly protects SMEs from credit fluctuations caused by 
global market and economic forces. Their example is now 
being emulated by other parallel currencies, such as the 
Sardex.11 I think that when Neoclassical economists were 
talking about the self-regulating market they had this idyllic 
picture in mind, but took a huge amount of political, 
democratic, and institutional infrastructure for granted, which 
could be argued to have been present in Britain in the second 
half of the 19th Century to a greater degree than in many other 
countries at that time. The uncritical application of the ‘self-
regulating market’ in countries that were farther behind in 
their democratic development – as well as in Britain itself – 
then led to famine, world wars, etc, as variously argued by 
Polanyi (2001[1944]) and others. 
LS: I like the Polanyi reference, but you are sounding a bit 
too Euro/Western-centric for my taste. 
PD: You are right. My “meta-point” is that it is possible to 
make sense of rather different positions (e.g. the modern vs. 
the post-modern), depending on which difficult issues one 
overlooks. For example, overlooking the power of the IMF 
(International Monetary Fund) relative to many governments, 
and the interests of the main private-sector players in the 
West/North, who have long influenced the WTO (World 
Trade Organisation), WIPO (World Intellectual Property 
Organisation), etc, makes it easier to accept a modernist 
interpretation of recent history. On the other hand, 
overlooking the unbelievably expensive (in terms of human 
lives) process through which over the past 300-400 years 
Western Europe has attempted to develop an understanding – 
and an acceptable implementation – of democracy makes it 
easier to embrace the fiercely critical post-modern perspective. 
LS: Fine – kind of – but what do we gain from such 
intellectual exercises? 
PD: The ability to see the other person’s point of view and 
to engage in a constructive debate. 
LS: I see. Anyway, leaving economics and politics aside 
for the moment, you mean that there is a middle ground 
between subjective perception and objective certainty? 
PD: Yes, Karl Popper called it ‘inter-subjective’, which in 
my mind is more or less the same as ‘socially constructed’. 
LS: Speaking of Popper, he also proposed a way to resolve 
the empiricist/inductive vs. rationalist/deductive dichotomy. 
He said that one could not generalize from a given set of 
empirical observations to a general law because we never 
know when an exception to the rule might arise. Similarly, we 
can’t be certain that our starting axioms are always going to be 
right. So he found a compromise in saying that for a theory to 
be valid it must be ‘falsifiable’. 
PD: Very nice. It sounds like a workable position for 
EINS. It enables us to make some claims, which could be 
inspired by empirical observations or by leaps of theoretical 
imagination, as long as we can design tests that could prove 
them to be false. 
LS: Yes, although it’s a bit of a trick, because in practical 
terms we still tend to generalize from experience. 
PD: True. And sometimes we make decisions based on 
axioms as if they were religious dogma.  
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LS: I am glad we are on the same page: the system view 
that engineers default to is generalizing and objectifying.  
PD: Generalizing because the totality and plurality of, for 
example, a part of a social system are assumed to apply to the 
whole system; by objectifying I think you mean that we treat 
the social system as if it were a physical object, that we lose 
track of the fact that it is made of individual human beings. 
LS: We need to go back to individuals, otherwise we can’t 
really talk about social construction. We can refer to social 
construction as a good compromise between relativism 
(tendency to acknowledge the co-existence of multiple 
realities, each of which deserves to be studied depending on 
the definition of the situation the actor gives) and objectivism 
(for which reality is like a physical object, a system made of 
sub-units working together harmoniously, where the paths of 
individuals are determined by existing structures).  
PD: Thankfully we have language, then, which makes it 
possible to reach some level of consensus over things like 
money, newspapers, and citizenship, as we were saying above.  
LS: I would push it a bit further. The first position holds 
that social actions refer to multiple realities and specific 
situations where actors give their own interpretations. The 
second supports the idea of an objective reality constraining 
social action within specific paths. Giving credit both to 
individual interpretations and constraining structures for 
action, we have ground for backing the idea that from 
subjective perceptions and definitions of reality individuals 
engage in social processes within shared norms and values. 
PD: And these social constructions are “real”, even if 
invisible, and help build institutions. 
LS: Yes. However, more than just language (as a tool) I 
would use Goffman’s frame analysis (1974). It avoids extreme 
relativism (each actor has its own definition of the situation) 
while rejecting determinism. Instead, actors use and define 
multiple situations according to other existing frames (that is 
to say, institutions). But now let’s move the discussion back to 
politics and economics. So, in political theory we have 
Habermas (1964) who says that if a group of citizens engage 
in public and democratic debate in the ‘public sphere’ they 
will eventually reach consensus, i.e. a dominant view, on 
specific issues. 
PD: Whereas Chantal Mouffe (2000), on the other hand, 
says that we might as well accept that some of us will never 
agree with each other and, therefore, that we should accept a 
dynamic exchange of positions as part of a healthy political 
process. She calls it ‘agonistic pluralism’, which we could 
regard as some middle ground between Habermasian 
consensus and the perennial and sterile polarisation we see in 
some political systems, for example in Italy since the Second 
War. This reminds me of Siedentop (2000) and the path 
towards Modernity. 
LS: What do you mean?  
PD: A central aspect of the modernity discourse is the 
issue of individual freedom versus allegiance to the group (be 
it family, tribe, city, or nation). For example, countries like 
Italy can be seen to be in the middle of a transition from a 
‘pre-individualist society’ (Siedentop 2000: 166–7), where the 
individual owes allegiance to his/her family before 
him/herself, to a society where the individual asserts his/her 
right to individual freedom. Of course the Western discourse 
of modernity has been amply criticised, for example, by 
postmodernist philosophers (Lyotard 1979) as being deaf to 
other paths of cultural evolution and self-discovery. 
LS: In other words, the possibility of a ‘big narrative’ of 
history for the evolution of different cultures or countries 
towards Modernity has been discredited. 
PD: Exactly. However, the point here is that, with respect 
to individualism and collectivism, the modernity debate has 
been appropriated by political currents that are concerned 
mainly with questions of socio-economic action. This has 
contributed to further polarisation. For example, individual 
freedom has been applied to economic action, becoming the 
cornerstone of neo-liberalism. By contrast, collectivism can be 
taken as the starting point for new value systems based on 
social capital, collaboration, and public goods theory. For 
historical reasons that we cannot consider here, collectivism is 
also associated with socialism, communism and fascism. 
These conflations can create significant tension within our 
fledgling EINS community, so we should probably try to set 
some boundaries. 
LS: Indeed! I see you have started to talk about economics 
again. Where are we going with that? 
PD: Let’s see, I happen to be sympathetic to some 
branches of heterodox economics, in particular Geoffrey 
Hodgson’s institutional economics (1988, 1993) and Stephen 
Gudeman’s economic anthropology (2001). Hodgson defines 
an institution 
…as a social organization which, through the operation of 
tradition, custom or legal constraint, tends to create durable 
and routinized patterns of behaviour. (Hodgson 1993) 
So an institution can be seen as a social construction. It is 
interesting that in Southern European countries the term 
‘institution’ can carry a significant negative connotation, 
whereas in Northern European countries this term is much 
more neutral, and in some cases it carries positive 
connotations. An example of this can be seen in the difference 
between the definition of institution by Hogson’s, who is 
English, and Trigilia’s, who is Italian: 
One can define institutions as a set of social norms which 
orient and regulate behavior and which are based on sanctions 
which seek to guarantee compliance on the part of 
individuals. (Trigilia 1998: 4) 
In Trigilia’s definition you can definitely sense the coercive 
power element, whereas Hogson’s is much more neutral and 
even benign.12 
LS: Interesting, I see your point, although I am not totally 
convinced. It can be understood in terms of frame, which I 
mentioned above. Different frames arise from different 
individual perceptions and contexts. Contexts are rich 
historical milieux where the perception of institution is related 
to the democratic process and to the form modernization took 
in different countries. We can make a parallel with the 
Internet. The way the Internet is governed (at a technical, 
economic, and social level) is a political process, and has to do 
with how power is exercised at the different scales of the 
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individual and the institution. It takes us back to the first part 
of the discussion: decisions (especially policies) are produced 
through a collective process imbued with images of society, 
economy, and technology. Therefore, they reflect the positions 
of the dominant class (or country, like the US in the case of 
the Internet) on specific issues. Talking about the Internet (or 
more generally ICTs) it is clear that dominant telcos want to 
influence regulatory decisions in a way that is opposite to 
user/citizen preferences. The control of the Internet 
governance process, which can be heavily influenced by the 
prevalent view on specific issues by different players, is at 
stake (the Net Neutrality debate exemplifies this well). 
PD: Yes, speaking of scale, we are clearly approaching 
questions of socio-economic action, in particular juxtaposing 
structuralism and individualism. I think it may be helpful to 
refer to Figure 2 at this point. Differing epistemologies are 
most evident when comparing natural science and social 
science, but they are also evident within the social sciences. A 
‘map of social science’ proposed by Hollis (1994) can be used 
to begin making sense of the large number of concepts we are 
throwing together here. Hollis’s map summarises the main 
analytical traditions in the social sciences divided along two 
axes: the first a commitment to objectivism or subjectivism, 
the second a commitment to structure or agency. 
As shown in Figure 2, the blue boxes indicate some of the 
social science epistemologies that we are discussing. A few 
indicative names are shown to make the table easier to 
interpret. The left-hand column is generally associated with 
the rationalist, deterministic tradition. In Western thought it is 
the older of the two, and grew out of naturalistic philosophy. 
The right-hand column is more recent, reflecting a greater 
emphasis on the social world in defining reality (ontology) and 
construction of knowledge (epistemology). Although 
interpreting the two columns as an objective-subjective 
dichotomy risks gross oversimplification, those in the left-
hand column can be grouped loosely as sharing a belief in 
some form of ‘objective’ reality, whereas a more ‘subjective’ 
perspective permeates the ideas of those named in the right 
column. The column on the left is generally acknowledged to 
have a much greater constituency (and to attract more funding) 
within social science than the traditions on the right that are 
inspired in part by a hermeneutic (i.e. interpretative) 
philosophy. The table can also be understood in terms of 
different accounts of social systems and human action. The 
top row favours a view of society and the economy that is 
biased toward the importance of structures and systems over 
individuals, whereas the bottom row represents the opposite 
emphasis. This distinction is reflected in methodology in the 
sense that theories in the top row tend to be deductive, 
deriving behaviour from general principles, whereas the 
bottom row is associated with the tradition of empiricism and 
positivism, where general principles are derived from 
experience through an inductive process. 
LS: I don’t agree on putting Weber in the upper-right 
quadrant, because he focuses more on individuals and on 
action rather than on society and structure. 
PD: Well, kind of. As explained by Hollis (1994: 147-
151), Weber’s starting point is individualist. However, his 
extension of ‘homo economicus’ into ‘homo sociologicus’ as 
rule-following individuals leads to, for example, organizations 
as ‘Weberian machines’ whose rational and bureaucratic traits 
are self-evident. So I think both views of Weber are possible. 
LS: I see. We said earlier that Popper provides a plausible 
way to reconcile the subjectivist-objectivist tension. Can 
something similar be done with the structure-agency tension? 
PD: Indeed! Giddens’s theory of Structuration does that 
very well, in my opinion. Giddens says that institutions 
provide a structure within which we live our lives. So to some 
extent they determine many of our actions. However, 
institutions themselves are the result of social constructivist 
processes in a specific time- and space-frame. To this I would 
add also progressive memory-dependent “crystallization”, i.e. 
the same process through which many flexible social norms 
eventually become rigid laws.13 In any case, the point is that 
through language our social interactions provide an upwell of 
transformative pressure from within institutions, which over 
longer time-scales are thereby able to renew themselves and 
evolve.  
LS: I understand that you think about language as an 
explaining category (as power could be). But, please, do not 
reduce everything to language! 
PD: All right, but don’t worry: language for me has a more 
important epistemological function than ontological role. In 
other words, I do not believe that social systems are made of 
communications, like – oversimplifying – Niklas Luhmann 
does. In any case, to me structuration provides a nice balance 
between top-down structuralism and bottom-up social 
constructivism. It represents a theoretical approach that tries to 
solve the macro/micro incommensurability. Again, the 
important thing to our discussion is that it highlights the 
dynamic and context-dependent nature of the process we are 
observing. 
LS: You sound like an sociologist! In other words, is 
Giddens saying that micro- (actors) and macro- (structures) 
levels influence each other in a long-term process? 
PD: Not exactly. Macro-structures influence individuals on 
short time-scales, whereas individuals, through social 
interactions, generally can influence institutions only over 
long time-scales. Anyway, we have a couple of binaries left to 
address: essentialist vs. existentialist and context-free vs. 
context-dependent binaries, which are similar, and the conflict 
vs. regulation binary. 
LS: We have kind of covered the latter. 
PD: Yes, but we can say a bit more. Burrell and Morgan 
(1979) provide a map of sociology that is similar in spirit to 
Hollis’s. It overlaps Hollis’s map on the subjective-objective 
axis, but instead of the structure-agency axis it relies on a 
conflict-regulation dichotomy. They argue that many works in 
sociology rely on an assumption that some level or “harmony” 
is attainable, for example Talcott Parsons’s functionalism.  
Others, for example Marx, believe that conflict is 
unavoidable and is intrinsic to human nature. Since I have an 
engineer’s mind, I saw an opportunity for a 3-D diagram, see 
Figures 3 and 4. Note that in Figure 4 the cube face the 
stickperson is looking at corresponds to Figure 2. Going 
onwords, my exposure to physics and my ever-stronger 
attraction towards mathematics provides a good balance for 
the social constructivist thinking. I was always partial to 
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administrative procedures are communicated and actioned informally, but 
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structure, and now I can see that this may be nothing more 
than how our minds are sensitive, to different degrees, to 
algebraic structure. 
LS: You lost me. 
PD: Algebraic structure is closely related to Platonic 
essentialism, which in my mind is related to context-free 
concepts and theories. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Map of social science (after Hollis 1994; and Dini et al. 2011) 
 
 
Fig. 3. 3-D view of social science (after Hollis 1994; and Burrell & Morgan 1979) 
 
 
Fig. 4. Social science in a box (after Hollis 1994; and Burrell & Morgan 1979) 
 
LS: Whatever you say! Anyway, where is the context 
dependence then? 
PD: In evolutionary dynamics. The DNA blueprint 
(genotype) of an individual organism can lead to slightly 
different phenotypes depending on the environment the 
organism develops in, and over many generations a species 
will adapt to its environment. So the core “design” – a 
common example is the eye – is fairly stable, but the finer 
details will change and adapt as the environment changes. An 
analogous perspective in the social sciences is provided by 
post-modernism. 
LS: You are making big leaps again, but OK. Where do we 
go from here? Where is the Internet in all this? And can you 
please provide an example of the parallel between organism 
and post-modernism. In my understanding, post-modernism 
opens up multiple paths to knowledge through relativism. 
Where is the link to the evolutionary dynamic of organisms 
and phenotypes? 
PD: Relativism is the basis of evolution. Natural selection 
is meaningful only relative to a given environment. In other 
words, a successful organism is only successful relative to a 
given environment, not in absolute terms. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
PD: If we combine the ideas we have talked about we 
should be able to start seeing how different disciplines and 
different individuals approach and relate to the Internet. 
LS: I suppose, but we haven’t yet arrived at an 
understanding of what the structure of Internet Science might 
be. 
PD: You are right, we have only started to sketch an 
outline. I believe that, whatever Internet Science might end up 
being composed of, it will depend to a significant extent on 
the dimensions I mentioned at the beginning: social 
constructivism, the interaction between power and knowledge, 
and some system of value that goes beyond current 
mainstream understandings of market and exchange economy, 
without negating either. But in this dialogue we have only 
touched on the second and we have not discussed the third at 
all. In any case, the idea is not so much to develop a single and 
unique view of what the Internet is or what Internet Science 
should be composed of. The idea we have been developing in 
our conversation is to set down some principles of interaction 
and communication for internet scientists, so that they can 
understand each other better as they work towards a common 
methodology for doing Internet Science, which might 
eventually lead to some shared understanding of what Internet 
Science may become. 
LS: That sounds good to me. ‘Til next time then! 
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